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AbstrACt
The use of same keys or equivalent keys should not be occurred in cryptographic communications because 
a cipher system utilising such keys to secure messages can be attacked even it possesses excellent cryptographic 
characteristics for extracting intelligible information from encrypted messages. Identification of crypts formed 
with such keys is an important task of traffic analysis of cryptographic communications to check the applicability 
of two-messages-on-same-key (TMSK) attack. To avoid its applicability, adequate safeguards are required. In the 
paper, we cryptanalyze stream encryption based cipher system and propose an intelligent identification methodology 
using multi-entropy measures and soft decision criteria for identification of encrypted images of same or equivalent 
keys. Experimental test results show that the crypts formed with same keys can be identified successfully with high 
precision. We also present the countermeasures against TMSK attack.
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1. IntroduCtIon
The advancement in information technology has increased 
the use of computer and mobile communication networks 
as well as multimedia data in text, audio, and visual form to 
exchange information. Such communication networks are 
open and an adversary may attack to extract vital information. 
Security of data is an important requirement to safeguard 
our vital information. The security of data can be achieved 
by the techniques of cryptography1 to conceal the contents, 
steganography to conceal the existence2,3, secret sharing to 
decompose data into different parts4, and spread spectrum 
communication to spread data over available bandwidth5,6. 
Cryptography based cipher system consists of encryption 
algorithm which transforms plain-messages into encrypted 
messages using encryption keys and decryption algorithm 
decrypts encrypted messages using decryption keys to 
obtain plain messages. An encryption algorithm may be 
based on symmetric-key-cryptography or asymmetric-key-
cryptography. Symmetric-key-cryptography uses encryption 
key and decryption key same and it is kept confidential. 
Asymmetric-key-cryptography uses encryption key and 
decryption key different where encryption key is kept open 
and decryption key is kept confidential. This paper concerns 
to symmetric-key-cryptography to analyse stream enciphering 
based cipher system for cryptographic communications. 
A stream cipher7,8 consists a pseudo random number generator 
(PRNG) to generate random binary key sequences are used 
to encrypt plain messages. The cryptographic primitives and 
parameters of an encryption algorithm of a stream cipher 
should be strong enough and the keys sequences should be 
random to avoid the applicability of cryptanalytic attacks. 
A stream cipher with appropriate cryptographic parameters 
possesses excellent cryptographic characteristics and immune 
to cryptanalytic attacks is called a cryptographically strong 
cipher system. Many pseudo random number generators9-14 
are reported to design stream ciphers. Boolean functions15,16, 
hash functions17,18 and chaotic functions18-22, have also been 
reported to design pseudo random number generators. 
In cryptographic communications, an adequate 
management of keys is necessary to avoid the repetition of keys 
and the applicability of attacks even an encryption algorithm is 
strong enough. The repetition of same keys may arrive due to 
weakness in key generation and inadequate use and handling 
of secret keys. Key management caters to prevent the leakage 
keys at any stage starting from its generation and finally loading 
into the crypto system. Key management practices23-26 should 
have an adequate and secure chain of actions including key 
generation, key loading into storage media, key transportation, 
transfer of specific key into specific device and loading into 
the crypto systems securely. It also includes to maintain the 
record of actions assuring change keys and erasing of used 
keys timely.
A cipher system can be attacked for extracting message 
(even partial or distorted message), identifying key (even 
few consecutive or non-consecutive key bits) and reducing 
bruit force complexity of encryption algorithm. An attack can Received : 04 February 2020, Revised : 12 May 2020 
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be applied under different conditions as known plain data, 
chosen plain data, chosen cipher data and known cipher data. 
Cryptanalysis is attempted for image encryption schemes based 
on pixel scrambling27, pixel inversion28, chaotic29-31 and auto-
locking and electrocardiography32. An attack applied under 
only known cipher data is very difficult. The cryptanalysis of 
image stream cipher system is attempted under a condition 
when only cipher data is known to identify encrypted images 
with same keys.
For a cipher system, the applicability of approximately 
equivalent keys may arrive if random key sequences differ 
slightly from each other for different keys due to weak 
cryptographic algorithm and its weak initial bits. The use of 
equivalent keys is not safe because encrypted messages can be 
decrypted by some of its equivalent keys. Hence, encryption 
keys should be unique for every message otherwise a TMSK 
attack can be applied. A stream cipher become vulnerable to 
attack if it encrypts two or more messages with same key. The 
construction of plain text is formed based on the knowledge 
of language characteristics. The words are guessed in one 
message, and these words are xor bit-by-bit with the xor of 
encrypted messages. The meaningful words of other messages 
are formed at places corresponding to correct guess words, 
otherwise a garbled text is formed. In the case of image ciphers, 
the guessing of image portion is very difficult to construct plain 
images until we guess (know) the exact portion of images. 
Even if we know the portion of an image, knowing of its exact 
gray level detail is extremely difficult. For encrypted images 
with same encryption key, the xor of these encrypted images 
gives intelligible information. In TMSK attack for encrypted 
text messages, probable words are guessed in one message 
based on intelligibility and meaningful words are formed in 
other message to solve crypts33-34. Finding the applicability of 
TMSK attack can be found by identifying crypts formed with 
same encryption keys. 
Analysis of huge traffic is a challenging task to 
check lapses and leakage of cryptographic system, and to 
find meaningful information from adversary’s traffic of 
cryptographic communications. It is the process to intercept 
and examine communications and requires huge data collection 
and rigorous processing. Traffic analysis caters the analysis 
and monitoring of data communicated and communication 
activities over communication networks. It is an important 
Task and lot of relevant work is reported in traffic analysis35-39 
which helps in future planning of networks36, formulation of 
practices37, network selection38, traffic prediction39, identifying 
and classifying communications such as watermarked 
and noisy images40, multimedia and text classification41-43, 
engineering of communication networks44, and classification 
of encryption algorithms45-46.  Identification of cipher data of 
same key is one of the task of traffic analysis to identify and 
segregate for extraction of vital intelligible information of 
adversaries. For classification of objects of interest, various 
techniques of statistical, structural, and nature inspired 
pattern recognition47-51 can be applied. Fuzzy computing 
is one of the soft computing techniques which classifies 
objects using the degree of belongingness and the similarity 
criteria for ambiguous and ill-defined class boundaries. Fuzzy 
decision criteria gives better classification compared to other 
conventional and binary decision criteria. Fuzzy concepts are 
applied successfully with other methods in a hybrid manner 
to improve their performance50,51. It is also reported that a 
fuzzy classification approach52 performs better compared 
to the support vector machine (SVM) to identify messages 
encrypted with same keys from the traffic of cryptographic 
communications. The classification performance is analysed 
by utilising the criteria of Wilkinson test53. Various statistical 
measures54-59 such as histogram, correlation, and co-occurrence 
entropy are reported to use as features of the patterns. We use 
the multi-entropy measures computed globally and locally as 
features of the images to classify them in classes as plain image 
or encrypted image and images encrypted with same keys or 
different keys. 
We present an identification methodology using multi-
entropy measures to characterize plain and crypt messages 
and apply these collectively in fuzzy decision to identify 
crypts formed with same/equivalent encryption keys. We use 
asymmetric membership functions60-61 to cater the variations 
in entropy measures of plain messages for computing degree 
of belongingness and maximum mean similarity scores to 
identify the class. The methodology identifies crypts of same/
equivalent encryption keys with high precision as shown in 
the results. For having a cryptanalytic immune cipher system, 
we present some countermeasures to safeguard cryptographic 
communications.
2. CIpher systeM
A cipher system62 is a cryptography based software/
hardware system which provides security to sensitive data. The 
main components of a cipher system are input-output modules, 
random source module, key scheduling module, and encryption 
algorithm module. When a call is initiated by a sender, random 
source module generates random bits. These bits go to key 
scheduling module which generates initial bits. These initial 
bits go to encryption algorithm module to initialize it. The 
encryption algorithm module of stream based cipher system 
after initialising with unique initial bits for every message, 
generates pseudo random key sequence which is added bit-by-
bit using xor operation with input message comes from input 
module to produce encrypted message. The encrypted message 
goes to the output module which send it to the receiver using 
secure communication protocols. At receiving end, the 
encrypted data is decrypted to get plain message. 
Apart from strong cipher modules with its adequate 
security strength, a cipher system should also have the 
following various other provisions: 
• Access control mechanism to assure authenticated usages 
for operation.
• Integrity mechanism to check alteration/corruption of 
codes and data.
• Maintenance and administrative activities of cipher 
system for audit.
• Erase mechanism to delete sensitive data.
• Tamper detection and response mechanism to prevent 
leakage of sensitive system information.
• Key change mechanism to prevent repetition of keys. 
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• Keyboard and display to access and operate system with 
ease and comfortably.
• Health check of system.
• Error display and alarm indication in case of corruption 
and system failure.
• Updating of cryptographic algorithm, key and access 
parameter whenever required. 
A cipher system should be analysed carefully for ensuring 
its cryptographic strength against cryptanalytic attacks. The 
strength of cipher system depends on the design of encryption 
algorithm and cryptographic primitives used. For a secure 
system, the cryptographic primitives and modules should 
be mathematically and statistically strong and should meet 
expected characteristics of cryptographic parameters such as 
brute force attack complexity, periodicity, linear complexity, 
unpredictability, and randomness. An attacker tries to obtain 
information about algorithm, keys, sequences and messages. 
According to Shannon criteria, a cipher system should not 
leak such information even with the availability of unlimited 
computing resources and encrypted data57. According to 
Kerckhoffs criteria, the security of information should lie 
entirely on the keys but not on the obscurity of the cryptographic 
algorithm63, i.e., the cryptographic algorithm except keys is 
public. Hence, if keys are not utilised and handled properly to 
avoid the repetition of keys and its improper use in initialisation 
of cryptographic algorithm then the cipher system becomes 
insecure and it leaves the scope of the applicability of TMSK 
attack.
A stream cipher based cipher system generates random 
binary sequences using cryptographic algorithm which consists 
shift registers. For maximal length binary key sequences 
with high non-linearity and randomness, proper feedback 
connections and suitable filtering and combining functions are 
chosen in the design of encryption algorithm. A key sequence 
is added with plain data bit-by-bit under modulo two to get 
encrypted data. let 1K  and 2K  be the key sequences, 1P  and 
2P  be the plain messages and, 1C  and 2C  be the encrypted 
messages, the encrypted images formed for different plain 
messages with different/same key sequences are given by 
following equations:
1 1 1 2 2 2,C P K C P K= ⊕ = ⊕               (1)
1 1 1 2 2 1,C P K C P K= ⊕ = ⊕                                                (2)
1 1 2 2 2 2,C P K C P K= ⊕ = ⊕                                               (3)
Symbol ⊕  denotes modulo two addition (xor operation) 
which gives output ‘1’ when two input are different 
otherwise ‘0’. 
Applying xor operation on encrypted messages 1C  and
2C  for which same key ( 1K  or 2K ) is used to encrypt 1P  and 
2P , we get 
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2C C P K P K P K P K P P⊕ = ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ = ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ = ⊕   (4)
In Eqns. (1) - (4), we see that 1P , 2P  are not random, 1K , 
2K  are random, 1 2K K⊕ is random, 1 2P P⊕  is not random, 
1C , 2C  are random and 1 1P K⊕ , 1 2P K⊕ , 2 1P K⊕ , 2 2P K⊕  
are random. In Eqn. (4), the effect of xor of same keys, i.e., 
1 1K K⊕  and 2 2K K⊕  gets cancelled. 
Hence, we get the xor of plain messages 1P  and 2P  when 
we xor 1C  and 2C  which are formed with same encryption 
keys.
For messages of image type, plain images appear random 
and intelligible but encrypted images appear random and 
unintelligible. The output images after xor of encrypted images 
with same keys look non-random and such images exhibit 
meaningful information which depends on the content and 
gray level variations of plain image. Such characteristics are 
exploited in identifying images encrypted with same keys. 
Two keys are said to be same if sequences for these keys 
are bit-by-bit same, i.e., if 1K , 2K  are two sequences then 
1 2( ) ( ) ,K i K i=  1i =  to n  where n  is the length of sequence. 
Two keys are said to be equivalent if sequences for 
these keys are approximately same and few bits differ, i.e., 
1 2( ) ( ) ,K i K i≠  for some ,i 1i =  to n . If k  is the number of bits 
differ in sequences 1K  and 2K then n k−  is the number of bits 
remain same in these sequences. For equivalent keys, the value 
of k  may be considered different for different kinds of data. 
Say, the keys are said to be equivalent with 10% dissimilarity if 
there are 10% mismatch of bits in key sequences. For example, 
the value of k  may be higher for image or speech data because 
these data are highly redundant and slight change in such data 
is unnoticeable. Also, the value of k  may be lesser for text 
data because it is less redundant and a slight change in text is 
significantly noticeable. 
In identification of encrypted data of same keys or 
equivalent keys, we treat both the cases as of same keys. 
3. MultI-entropy MeAsures And 
ChArACterIstICs
The randomness or non-randomness of messages can be 
found using a number of statistical measures such as grey level 
distribution, adjacent correlation and co-occurrence measures. 
In this paper, we consider an entropy measures58,59 obtained 
globally and locally for sub-block and bit-plane of images to 
identify crypts of stream ciphers formed with same keys. An 
entropy measure proposed by Claude Shannon is associated to 
random variables and uses as a measure of information.
3.1 Global entropy
Entropy of a random variable X is given by the equation
2
1
( ) log
L
i i
i
H X p p
=
= − ∑                                                   (5)
where ( ),i i ip prob X x x= =  is the 
thi  possible value of X  
from L  symbols and ip  is the possibility of iX x= . The value 
of ( )H X  lies between 1 to 2log L , i.e., 21 ( ) log .H X L≤ ≤  
For a random message of L symbols in which each symbols 
occurs equally 1 2 1( ... 1 / ),L Lp p p p L−= = = = =  the value of 
entropy is given by 2log L . The entropy measure computed for 
a message S  is called as the global entropy of .S
Global entropy varies from 0 to 2log L  for non-random 
data. It may not be able to exhibit the local non-randomness of 
S  for which ( )H S  is near to 2log L which is the highest value 
of ( )H S  for a random data. To see the local non-randomness 
of ,S  local entropies can be considered. 
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3.2 sub-block entropy
Sub-block entropy ( , )Bk T  with respect to local k  number 
of non-overlapping sub-blocks 1 2, ,... ,KS S S  each of size BT  
within ,S  are obtained by finding entropy ( )kH S  over all 
the sub-blocks. The size of an image should be reasonable to 
get the fair estimate of Shannon entropy. Also, the value of k  
and BT  should be adequate in number and size respectively to 
get fair values of local Shannon entropy. A k  number of sub-
blocks of S  can be taken in non-overlapping manner randomly 
instead of all the sub-blocks of .S  Average sub-block local 
entropy is taken as the average of local entropies computed 
for a number of different sub-blocks to fairly cater the local 
randomness of .S
As the finding of global entropy requires entire S and 
finding of local entropy requires only the portion of ,S  the 
local entropy is computed efficiently. In view of inaccuracy of 
global entropy, it is preferable to use local entropy to see the 
local non-randomness of .S  
3.3 bit-plane entropy
When global and sub-block entropy measures are not 
giving information of local non-randomness of ,S we can 
compute local entropy for bit-planes of S  in a non-overlapping 
manner as similar to sub-blocks local entropy to see the non-
randomness of S  at bit-plane level. 
For an image ( , )S x y  with 8 bit/pixel, we have 8 different 
bit-planes, ( , , ), 1b x y k k = to 8 where k  indicates the number 
of bit-planes. Bit-plane ( , ,1)b x y  is known as most significant 
bit (MSB) plane and ( , ,8)b x y  is known as least significant bit 
(lSB) plane. 
To see the adequacy of the global and local entropy 
measures, we consider an image ( , )I x y of size 256 256×  
as shown in Fig. 1, where ( , ) mod( ,256)I x y x y= ×  and 
1 , 256.x y≤ ≤   
Values of global, sub-blocks local and bit-pixel local 
entropies computed for an image of Fig. 1 are given as:
• Global Entropy = 7.7117
• Sub-blocks local entropies (from upper-left to lower-right 
sub-blocks) = 7.7037, 7.7037, 7.7037, 7.7011
• Bit-planes local entropies (from MSB to LSB bit-planes) 
= 0.8113, 0.9544, 0.9887, 0.9972, 0.9993, 0.9998, 1.0000, 
1.0000 
The global and local entropy measures have different 
values. The values of global entropy and block entropies are 
on higher side and all appears approximately equal, and it is 
difficult to differentiate such images from random data. The 
values of bit-plane local entropies are increasing from MSB 
plane to lSB plane. The individual use of these entropies 
may not give good detail of non-randomness. Applying these 
entropies together can give good measures of non-randomness 
of data. The mean values of sub-blocks entropies and bit-planes 
entropies can also be computed by measuring their averages.
3.4 entropy specific Image Characteristics
To study the characteristics of plain images and encrypted 
images with respect to entropy measures, we consider a number 
of images and compute global entropy and local entropies for 
sub-blocks and bit-planes of images.
For illustration, we present the values of multi-entropies 
measures for three different images Baboon (I1), Monalisa (I2) 
and Cameraman (I3) each of size 256 256×  and their encrypted 
images C1 = I1 xor K1, C2 = I2 xor K2, C3 = I3 xor K3, and 
xor form of images C1 xor C2, C1 xor C3, C xor C3, C1 xor 
C4, C1 xor C5, C4 xor C5 as shown in Figs. 2, 3, 4. 
The key sequences K1, K2, K3 are obtained through a 
random number generator form Matlab. One can consider 
any generator to get random sequences for such image stream 
encryption. Figure 2 shows plain images I1, I2, I3 and key 
sequence K1, K2, K3 along with their histograms. Figure 3 
shows encrypted images along with their histograms. Figure 4 
shows images from xor of encrypted images along with their 
histograms. The values of global and local entropies for images 
of Figs. 2, 3, 4 are given in Table 1, 2 where Table 1 shows the 
global entropy and sub-block entropies and Table 2 shows the 
bit-plane entropies. 
From Fig. 2, we see that the plain images appear intelligible 
and their histograms appear non-uniform. The keys shown 
as images appear unintelligible and their histograms appear 
uniformly distributed. From Fig. 3, we see that encrypted 
Figure 1. simulated image and its histogram.
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Figure 3. encrypted images with different keys and same keys along with their histograms.
Figure 2. plain images (baboon, Monalisa, Cameraman), key sequences and their histograms.
images appear unintelligible and their histograms appear 
flattened and uniformly distributed. From Fig. 4, we see that 
images from xor of encrypted images with different keys 
appear unintelligible and their histograms appear flattened 
like the histograms of encrypted images. The images from 
xor of encrypted images with same keys appear with some 
intelligibility and some meaningful information is visible in 
distorted form and their histograms appear non-uniformly 
distributed. 
From Table 1 and 2 it is observed that the values of global, 
sub-block and bit-plane entropies of plain images and images 
from xor of encrypted images with same keys are lesser to 
the entropies of encrypted images and also to the entropies of 
images from xor of encrypted images with different keys. The 
bit-plane entropies of MSB planes of plain images are lesser 
than to the bit-plane entropies of lSB planes of plain images. 
The bit-plane entropy of encrypted images and xor encrypted 
images with different keys has high values and is almost 
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same for all the bit-planes starting from MSB to lSB planes. 
The entropy values of xor encrypted images with same keys 
have lesser values but different from entropy values of plain 
images. The values global entropy and sub-block entropy may 
vary from 0 to 8 and the values of bit-plane entropy may vary 
from 0 to 1 depending on the content of plain images.
These entropy measures can be used as features to identify 
the encrypted images formed with same keys or different 
messages. From the analysis of these entropies for different 
images we come to know that the entropy measures vary in 
wider range. The conventional approaches of pattern recognition 
for classification of such images are not suited and we consider 
a fuzzy decision approach to identify images encrypted 
with same or different keys. The detailed analysis of these 
entropies for different images of each class helps in establishing 
the values of parameters of fuzzy membership function.  
Figure 4. Images after xor of encrypted images with different keys and same keys and their histograms.
table 1. Global entropy and sub-block entropy measures for plain images, key sequences, encrypted images and xor of images
Image Global entropy
local entropy
block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 Avg.
I1 = Baboon 6.6962 6.6299 6.4968 6.6610 6.4956 6.5708
I2 = Monalisa 7.6916 7.6756 6.4412 7.2327 7.0098 7.0898
I3 = Cameraman 7.0097 5.8926 6.1224 6.5959 7.1177 6.4322
K1 = Random Seq. 8.0000 7.9953 7.9953 7.9942 7.9942 7.9948
K2 = Random Seq. 8.0000 7.9946 7.9946 7.9933 7.9934 7.9940
K3 = Random Seq. 8.0000 7.9940 7.9940 7.9942 7.9942 7.9941
C1 = I1 ⊕ K1 7.9977 7.9894 7.9898 7.9885 7.9896 7.9893
C2 = I2 ⊕ K2 7.9975 7.9885 7.9885 7.9888 7.9876 7.9883
C3 = I3 ⊕ K3 7.9973 7.9898 7.9888 7.9888 7.9874 7.9889
C4 = I2 ⊕ K1 7.9974 7.9893 7.9897 7.9889 7.9890 7.9892
C5 = I3 ⊕ K1 7.9976 7.9906 7.9894 7.9898 7.9825 7.9886
C1 ⊕ C2 7.9971 7.9873 7.9907 7.9871 7.9891 7.9886
C1 ⊕ C3 7.9970 7.9889 7.9906 7.9893 7.9878 7.9892
C2 ⊕ C3 7.9969 7.9889 7.9881 7.9885 7.9882 7.9884
C1 ⊕ C4 7.9273 7.8743 7.9279 7.5852 7.5106 7.7244
C1 ⊕ C5 7.9229 7.7117 7.3550 7.7251 7.8759 7.6669
C4 ⊕ C5 7.9204 7.7745 7.6534 7.8665 7.8479 7.7856
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4. MultI-entropy bAsed IdentIFICAtIon 
MethodoloGy
Traffic of communications may include plain data in 
addition to encrypted data which might be of same keys or 
different keys. Identifying images encrypted with same keys 
directly prior to separating out plain images is very difficult 
because the features values of plain images and encrypted 
images with same keys are not able to distinguish such images. 
The methodology of identification of images encrypted with 
same keys or equivalent keys takes the task 
as a two class problem and resolves it in 
following two stages: 
• Segregation of plain images and 
encrypted images and 
• Segregation of encrypted images with 
same keys or equivalent keys and 
images encrypted with different keys. 
The block diagram of identification 
methodology is given in Fig. 5. The traffic 
data is segregated in four different classes. 
In identification methodology, the finding 
of prominent features of data plays a vital 
role to classify data accurately. Here, 
we consider multi-entropy measures to 
discriminate different data and classify 
these precisely. The combined use of all 
these local and global entropy measures 
can give better classification compared 
to its individual use for classification of 
encrypted images. Based on the analysis 
of the characteristics of different images 
as plain, encrypted, and xor images of encrypted images with 
same/equivalent or different keys, we consider ten features 1f  
to 10f  given by following equations: 
1 ( )f GlobalEntropy GE=                                               (6)
2 2( )f SubBlockEntropy SBLE=                                     (7)
3 3( )f SubBlockEntropy SBLE=                                      (8)
table 2. bit-plane entropy measures for plain images, key sequences, encrypted images and xor of images
Image
bit-plane entropy
bp 1 bp 2 bp 3 bp 4 bp 5 bp 6 bp 7 bp 8 Avg.
I1 = Baboon 0.0000 0.9999 0.9868 0.9961 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.8728
I2 = Monalisa 0.9584 0.9285 1.0000 0.9909 0.9987 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 0.9845
I3 = Cameraman 0.9732 0.6741 0.9994 0.9844 0.9957 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9534
K1=Random Seq. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
K2=Random Seq. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
K3=Random Seq. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C1 = I1 ⊕ K1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C2 = I2 ⊕ K2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C3 = I3 ⊕ K3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C4 = I2 ⊕ K1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C5 = I3 ⊕ K1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C1 ⊕ C2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C1 ⊕ C3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C2 ⊕ C3 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C1 ⊕ C4 0.9584 0.9978 0.9979 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9945
C1 ⊕ C5 0.9732 0.9956 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9960
C4 ⊕ C5 0.9680 0.9698 0.9989 0.9987 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9919
Figure 5. Block diagram of methodology of class identification.
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4 4( )f SubBlockEntropy SBLE=                                     (9)
5 5( )f SubBlockEntropy SBLE=                                   (10)
1
6
1
(1/ 1)
k
i
i
f k SBLE
=
= ∑                                                    (11)
7 1( )f BitPlaneLocalEntropy BPLE=                           (12)
8 2( )f BitPlaneLocalEntropy BPLE=                           (13)
f9=BitplaneLocalEntropy(BPLE3) 
                              (14)
2
10
1
(1/ 2)
k
i
i
f k BPLE
=
= ∑                                                  (15)
In Eqns. (11) and (15), 1k  and 2k  are the number of sub-
blocks and number of bit-planes and these are taken as 4 and 
8 respectively. These features constitute a feature vector of a 
pattern.
Fuzzy decision criteria resolves ambiguous problems and 
gives better classification results as compared to conventional 
decision criteria. A crisp set based criteria takes binary decision 
whereas fuzzy set based criteria takes a fuzzy decision in 
terms of degree of belongingness to perform classification of 
objects.  
For an element ix  of set ,A  the membership value of 
ix  to set ,A  is denoted as ( )ixµ  which is computed using 
a membership function. Classification of unknown pattern 
is obtained among reference pattern classes using average 
similarity scores. A given pattern is categorised to a particular 
reference class for which it has high similarity value. 
For computing the membership value for feature 
elements, we use a quantitative asymmetric kind of triangular 
fuzzy membership functions similar to Mamdani-type fuzzy 
function60-61.
For thrc  reference pattern, let ( )rcT i  be the feature value 
and 1 ( )rcTh i , 2 ( )rcTh i  be the thresholds for 
thi  element of 
feature vector. let ( )P iµ  be the value of 
thi  element of feature 
vector of given pattern to be classified. Similarity value ( , )P rc iµ  
is obtained as ( , )P rc iµµ  using triangular fuzzy membership 
function. The parameters 1 ( )rcTh i  and 2 ( )rcTh i  of membership 
function are taken carefully based on the knowledge and analysis 
of measures for different reference class patterns and based on 
the classification results obtained by varying threshold values. 
The establishment of parameters of membership function plays 
a vital role in making decisions and the precise selection of 
parameter values compute membership values appropriately 
for performing correct classification. Fuzzy membership 
function can take symmetric or asymmetric shape depending 
on values of 1 ( )rcTh i  and 2 ( ).rcTh i  Mathematically, triangular 
fuzzy membership functions compute the membership values 
with respect to reference class pattern as given in following 
equations: 
   
( ) ( ) ( ( )) 1
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( )) 0
( ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( )) / 1 ( )
RC
RC RC
RC RC RC
If P i T i then P i
elseif P i T i Th i then P i
else P i Th i T i P i Th i
µ µ
µ µ
µ µ
≥ µ =
≤ − µ =
µ = − −
 (16)
   
( ) ( ) ( ( )) 1
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ( )) 0
( ( )) ( 2 ( ) ( ) ( )) / 2 ( )
RC
RC RC
RC RC RC
If P i T i then P i
elseif P i T i Th i then P i
else P i Th i T i P i Th i
µ µ
µ µ
µ µ
≤ µ =
≥ + µ =
µ = − −   
(17)
Equation (16) computes membership values of feature 
element for crypt class or crypts with different encryption keys 
class and Eqn. (17) computes membership values of feature 
element for plain class or crypts with same encryption keys.
A given image is classified as a plain/encrypted image 
or encrypted images are classified as images encrypted with 
same/different keys on the basis of similarity score rcS  which 
is given following equation: 
1
(1/ ) ( ( , ))
n
rc
i
S n P rc iµ
=
= µ∑                                             (18)
where n  is the number of features. An unknown image belongs 
to the rc  reference image class for which the value of rcS  
computed for features of unknown image is maximum.
5. test results And perForMAnCe
Identification methodology is implemented in Matlab 
programming and applied on a number of plain and encrypted 
images. For an illustration, we demonstrate experimental tests 
on different images each of size 256 256×  as shown in Fig. 6. In 
the experiments, we have taken a number of encrypted images 
obtained by using a number of random binary key sequences 
and xor with plain images as stream enciphering. Some of the 
encrypted images are obtained with same key sequences and 
some are obtained with different key sequences.
Features for each given image as mentioned above and 
the membership values as well as the similarity scores with 
respect to reference class patterns are computed to classify a 
given image. The values of feature vectors of reference patterns 
are kept same to compute fuzzy membership values for plain/
encrypted images and for images from xor of encrypted images 
with same/different keys. Threshold values are also kept same 
for reference classes.
As the class decision depends on the establishment of 
parameters of triangular fuzzy membership function, the values 
of parameters for reference classes and threshold parameters 
need to be chosen carefully. Appropriate establishment of 
parameters values of triangular fuzzy membership functions 
performs correct classification of given patterns. In the 
experiment for the problem of identification, we perform the 
analysis of entropy for different images of each reference 
class to establish their reference values for each feature and 
threshold values by varying these to attain successful 
classification. The establishment of parameters of triangular 
fuzzy membership function requires once only. There is a 
larger variation in entropy for plain images, slightly lesser 
variation for xor images encrypted with same keys and very 
less variation for encrypted images and xor images encrypted 
with different keys. 
Based on above analysis, the parameter values of 
triangular fuzzy membership function for reference class plain 
( )plainT i  and xor of crypts with same key ( ),skT i  crypt ( )cryptT i  
and xor of crypts with different keys ( )dkT i  are established as:
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( ) ( )plain skT i T i=  = 7.98, 7.95, 7.95, 7.95, 7.95, 7.95, 0.99, 
0.99, 0.99, 0.99
( ) ( )crypt dkT i T i=  = 7.99, 7.99, 7.99, 7.99, 7.99, 7.99, 1.00, 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00
Based on varying threshold analysis, the values of 
thresholds for triangular fuzzy membership function 1 ( )rcTh i  
and 2 ( )rcTh i  for reference classes plain 1 ( ), 2 ( )plain plainTh i Th i  
and xor of crypts with same key 1 ( ), 2 ( )sk skTh i Th i  crypt 
1 ( ), 2 ( )crypt cryptTh i Th i  and xor of crypts with different keys 
1 ( ), 2 ( )dk dkTh i Th i  are established as:
1 ( ) 1 ( )plain skTh i Th i=    = 0.002, 0.010, 0.010, 0.010, 0.010, 
0.010, 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.0001 
2 ( ) 2 ( )plain skTh i Th i=  = 7.600, 7.900, 7.900, 7.900, 7.900, 
7.900, 0.010, 0.010, 0.010, 0.010 
1 ( ) 1 ( )crypt dkTh i Th i=    = 0.010, 0.100, 0.100, 0.100, 0.100, 
0.100, 1.000, 1.000, 1.000, 1.000
2 ( ) 2 ( )crypt dkTh i Th i=  = 0.299, 0.050, 0.050, 0.050, 0.000, 
0.050, 0.050, 0.050, 0.050, 0.050
5.1 Classification results
Identification of plain/encrypted images and encrypted 
images with same/different keys:
Plain Images
(i) ( )P iµ  =  6.6962  6.6299  6.4968  6.6610  6.4956  6.5708 
0.0000  0.9999  0.9868  0.8728
 ( , )P crypt iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8210  0.0000  0.8318  0.0000 0.8204  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.9839
 ( , )P plain iµµ  =  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000  0.8021  1.0000  1.0000  
 cryptS  = 0.4457, plainS  = 0.9802; Class identified: Plain image
(ii) ( )P iµ  =  7.6916  7.6756  7.4412  7.2327  7.0098  7.3398 
0.9584  0.9285  1.0000  0.9845
 ( , )P crypt iµµ  =  0.0000  0.9586  0.0000  0.9041  0.0000 0.9177  0.0000  0.9909  0.9959  0.9980 
 ( , )P plain iµµ  =  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9004  1.0000
 cryptS  = 0.5765, plainS  = 0.9900; Class identified: Plain image
(iii) ( )P iµ  =  0.0000  0.7240  0.0000  0.8235  0.0000  0.8028 
0.0000  0.9587  0.9352  0.9941 
 ( , )P crypt iµµ  =  0.0000  0.0744  0.0000  0.7636  0.0000 0.6466  0.0000  0.9587  0.9352  0.9941
 ( , )P plain iµµ  =  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9065  1.0000
 cryptS  = 0.5238, plainS  = 0.9906; Class identified: Plain image
Encrypted Images
(i) ( )P iµ  =  7.9976  7.9886  7.9880  7.9892  7.9886  7.9886 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P crypt iµµ  =  1.0000  0.9998  0.8033  0.9999  0.8581 0.9998  1.0000  1.0000  0.9994  1.0000
 ( , )P plain iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8709  0.6197  0.2150  0.6142 0.2276  0.9000  0.8001  0.9001  0.8001 
 cryptS  = 0.9660, plainS  = 0.5948; Class identified: Encrypted image
(ii) ( )P iµ  =  7.9970  7.9887  7.9890  7.9899  7.9885  7.9890 
1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P crypt iµµ  =  1.0000  0.9998  0.9025  1.0000  0.8460 0.9999  0.9975  1.0000  0.9987  1.0000
 ( , )P plain iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8707  0.6098  0.2017  0.6154 0.2197  0.9003  0.8000  0.9001  0.8002
 cryptS  = 0.9744, plainS  = 0.5918; Class identified: Encrypted image
(iii) ( )P iµ  =  7.9972  7.9877  7.9900  7.9877  7.9893  7.9887 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P crypt iµµ  =  1.0000  0.9997  1.0000  0.9997  0.9281 0.9998  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P plain iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8741  0.6000  0.2457 0.6072  0.2267  0.9000  0.8001  0.9000  0.8001
 cryptS  = 0.9927, plainS  = 0.5954; Class identified: Encrypted image
Figure 6. plain images: (a) baboon, (b) Monalisa, (c) Cameraman, (d) baby, (e) pepper, (f) Children, (g) lena, and (h) street.
(a)
(e)
(b)
(f)
(c)
(g) (h)
(d)
DEF. SCI. J., VOl. 70, NO. 4, JulY 2020
434
xor of Encrypted Images with Same/Equivalent Keys
(i) ( )P iµ  =  7.9273  7.8743  7.9279  7.5852  7.5106  7.7245 
0.9584  0.9978  0.9979  0.9943
 ( , )P dk iµµ  =  0.0000  0.9848  0.0000  0.9488  0.0000 0.9664  0.0000  0.9997  0.7882  0.9993
 ( , )P sk iµµ  =  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000  0.8432  0.9212  0.9150
 dkS  = 0.5687, skS  = 0.9679; Class identified: Images 
encrypted with same keys
(ii) ( )P iµ  =  7.9229  7.7117  7.3550  7.7251  7.8759  7.6669 
0.9732  0.9956  0.9999  0.9961
 ( , )P dk iµµ  =  0.0000  0.9634  0.0000  0.9665  0.0000 0.9591  0.0000  0.9994  0.9908  0.9995
 ( , )P sk iµµ  =  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000  0.8875  0.9009  0.8784
 dkS  = 0.5879, skS  = 0.9667; Class identified: Images 
encrypted with same keys
(iii) ( )P iµ  =  7.9204  7.7745  7.6534  7.8665  7.8479  7.7856 
0.9680  0.9698  0.9989  0.9919
 ( , )P dk iµµ  =  0.0000  0.9716  0.0000  0.9844  0.0000 0.9741  0.0000  0.9962  0.8926  0.9990
 ( , )P sk iµµ  =  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9107  0.9613
 dkS  = 0.5818, skS  = 0.9872; Class identified: Images 
encrypted with same keys
xor of Encrypted Images with Different Keys
(i) ( )P iµ  =  7.9974  7.9876  7.9900  7.9890  7.9881  7.9887 
1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P dk iµµ  =  1.0000  0.9997  1.0000  0.9999  0.8099 0.9998  0.9996  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P sk iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8742  0.5995  0.2209  0.6190 0.2263  0.9000  0.8000  0.9000  0.8001
 dkS  = 0.9809, skS  = 0.5940; Class identified: Images 
encrypted with different keys
(ii) ( )P iµ  =  7.9969  7.9895  7.9897  7.9875  7.9895  7.9891 
1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P dk iµµ  =  1.0000  0.9999  0.9713  0.9997  0.9505 0.9999  0.9999  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P sk iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8677  0.6029  0.2499  0.6050 0.2187  0.9000  0.8001  0.9000  0.8002
 dkS  = 0.9821, skS  = 0.5944; Class identified: Images 
encrypted with different keys
(iii) ( )P iµ  =  7.9970  7.9883  7.9889  7.9879  7.9884  7.9884 
1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000
 ( , )P dk iµµ  =  1.0000  0.9998  0.8891  0.9997  0.8419 0.9998  0.9993  1.0000  0.9991  1.0000
 ( , )P sk iµµ  =  0.0000  0.8719  0.6111  0.2416  0.6158 0.2323  0.9001  0.8000  0.9001  0.8001
 dkS  = 0.9729, skS  = 0.5973; Class identified: Images 
encrypted with different keys
Above results show that the given images can be classified 
without ambiguity because the score values are well separable. 
Hence, the cryptographic data of image stream enciphering can 
be segregated successfully. 
5.2 performance
Performance of classification and segregation of unknown 
patterns will decrease if the values of features for reference 
patterns and thresholds for different fuzzy functions are not 
taken appropriately. Fuzzy membership functions are fixed 
with appropriate values based on the knowledge of variations 
studied once only for different images and not for every 
run to analyse traffic of cryptographic communications for 
identification of images encrypted with same keys. The values 
of scores are very high for correct classes and low for incorrect 
classes as can be seen from the above examples.  
A plot showing score values for different classes as plain 
image, encrypted image, images encrypted with same keys, and 
images encrypted with different keys is given in Fig. 7 where 
higher score values (red colour) indicate for correct classes and 
lower score values (blue colour) indicate for incorrect class. It 
is seen from the plot that the class scores values are far apart 
from each other, higher score values for right class and lower 
class values for wrong class.
The performance of multi-entropy feature based class 
identification is compared with fuzzy bit-plane feature based 
method52. The results are shown in Table 3. 
We see from Table 3 that the proposed multi-entropy 
based method performs better with high precision. According 
to Wilkinson test53, the variance of class scores should be 
minimum near to zero. Moreover, both the mean and median of 
class scores should be approximately equal to each other. The 
mean score values are about 0.97 to 0.99 and variance is less to 
0.00019 for correct classes for proposed method whereas these 
values are about 0.56 to 0.67 and less to 0037 respectively for 
other method52. The variation in class score values is lesser 
for encrypted images with different keys and higher for plain 
images and encrypted images with same keys. The higher 
variation in class scores for plain images and encrypted images 
with same keys is due to values of features vary within wider 
range. The proposed classification method performs better 
compared to SVM method64 as the same has also been shown 
by other fuzzy classification methods52, 60.
Table 3. Classification performance
Image class
Value of class scores for multi-entropy based 
method (proposed)
Value of class scores for bit-plane feature based 
method52
Mean value Median value Variance value Mean value Median value Variance value
Plain image 0.9900 0.9900 0.000041 0.5625 0.5473 0.0038
Encrypted  image 0.9791 0.9802 0.000169 0.6763 0.6748 0.00035
Image encrypted with same keys 0.9755 0.9728 0.000190 0.5616 0.5441 0.0037
Image encrypted with different keys 0.9732 0.9738 0.000147 0.6731 0.6712 0.00037
RATAN & YADAV : CRYPTANAlYSIS OF AN IMAGE CIPHER uSING MulTI-ENTROPY MEASuRES AND THE COuNTERMEASuRES
435
6. CounterMeAsures AGAInst tMsK 
AttACK
A cipher system should use a unique key generated 
through a random number generator (RNG) module for every 
message to be encrypted. RNG module is a random source can 
be based on software and hardware. It may be a deterministic or 
nondeterministic. A deterministic RNG module can regenerate 
the same output bits by giving same seed and it is called as 
pseudo random number generator (PRNG). A nondeterministic 
RNG module cannot regenerate the same output sequence, i.e., 
it gives different output bits for every instance and it is called 
as Real Random Number Generator (RRNG) or true random 
number generator (TRNG). A cipher system uses a key of 
fixed size and it may vary for system-to-system depending on 
its design. After exhausting all possible keys, these will start 
repeating irrespective of the design mechanism of TRNG/
PRNG module. So, a cipher system should have the mechanism 
and procedure to initialize the encryption algorithm uniquely 
even after repetition of such keys. The PRNG/RRNG module 
of a cipher system should be checked statistically to meet 
cryptographic properties65-68. Also, if key sequences generated 
for different keys are equal or approximately equal then the keys 
are considered as the equivalent keys. The use of equivalent 
keys is also not advisable as these can be attacked. Some of the 
measures which prevent the applicability of TMSK attack are 
mentioned in the following paragraphs:  
• Avoid the repetition of keys generated by RNG. The 
non-repetition of keys can be ensured by measuring the 
maximal order complexity (MOC) for a number of output 
bit streams of random source (RNG) to be used for key 
generation. For a binary sequence of length N, the value 
of MOC68 is given by 22log N . The MOC is the maximum 
length of a binary pattern which repeats in a sequence. 
The value of MOC should be larger to the size of key for 
any RNG output sequence to ensure the non-repetition of 
same key. If the length of the key is L  bits, the MOC of 
output sequence of RNG should be larger than L . For key 
length of L  bits, there are 2L  number of possible keys. 
• Initial vector (IV) used to initialize cryptographic 
algorithms should be derived uniquely to avoid the 
repetition of same key sequence output69-71. The IV 
generation module also known as key scheduler module 
should be non-linear, one-way secure mechanism to 
obtain IV bits. These IV bits should not be taken directly 
the RNG output. The IV generation module should be 
obtained in a non-linear manner and it should provide 
unique IV for every message encryption. 
• Both the key and IV bits should meet the key avalanche 
criteria, i.e., for any keys and IVs, the sequences 
generated should be drastically different72 and the 
possibility of related keys or equivalent keys should not 
occur. According to avalanche criteria, a small change 
in input bits to the cipher system should make a drastic 
change (50% dissimilarity) randomly in the output key 
sequence bits. The avalanche criteria should meet for all 
the cases, i.e., key to IV, key to key sequence and IV to 
key sequence.
• Situation of an equivalent key may appear due to an 
inappropriate generation and use of key bits and IV bits. 
There should not be any such weakness in the utilisation 
of key bits in key scheduler and IV bits in initialising 
cryptographic algorithm. All the IV bits should be 
uniquely utilised none of the bits left unused or redundant 
in crypto algorithm initialisation.
Figure 7. Plot for identification of images with proposed method as encrypted with plain/encrypted and same/different keys
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• To meet the security requirements for an intended 
purpose, key length should be large enough to prevent 
non-repetition of keys. The PRNG or RRNG to be 
considered for generating non-repetitive keys of length L  
and it should pass randomness tests to assure getting key 
random and unrelated at any instance. For key length of 
L , the key diversity is 2L and the keys will start repeating 
after 2L  number of keys used. 
• Cryptographic keys should never be kept alongside 
with any other data accessible by customers. These keys 
should be kept separately and securely with adequate 
protection and not accessible by any unintended customer. 
It is preferable to keep these keys in encrypted form 
and should be made available in unencrypted from in 
secure and tamper protected environment. unsafe and 
unprotected storage of keys makes vulnerable to expose 
and get compromised. 
• Cryptographic keys must be destroyed after its expiry to 
avoid its accidental reuse and repetition. Keys which are 
not destroyed after expiry may be reused unintentionally. 
The reuse of keys should never be allowed to avoid 
applicability of TMSK attack.
• Use of default or pre-set keys if any, should not be 
allowed for use in encrypting messages. These keys will 
get repeating due to its frequent usage and such situations 
need to be avoided in cryptographic communications. To 
avoid such situations, the provision of such keys should 
not be provided in the systems.  
• Cipher system should have the provision to maintain audit 
log and alarming indicator to show the compromise of 
keys.
• Customer should take care to manage keys of ciphers to 
avoid repetition of same keys23-26. The cryptographic keys 
should be changed in the system well in time to avoid the 
situation of applicability of TMSK attack. 
• If keys are not changed in time as per requirements, 
the cipher system should have the provision to stop the 
communication. The cipher system should have the 
alarming indicator enabling change of keys timely.
• The aim of a cipher system is to provide security to the 
message to be communicated. If both the provisions 
plain and crypt modes are required in a cipher system 
for communication, then the plain mode should not by 
default because it may communicate a vital information 
in plain form unintentionally which is not desirable. Crypt 
mode should work by default. To avoid unintentional 
communication of vital messages in plain mode, the cipher 
system should not have the provision of plain mode and it 
should be removed permanently. 
• Always follow the best practices of key management23-26 
to avoid the situations of key reuse, key leakage, and 
key compromised. If there is any weak point in key 
management, it should be resolved adequately to mitigate 
the risks of misuse of cryptographic keys.
Any issue weakening key generation module, initialisation 
of encryption algorithm, design of cryptographic algorithm, 
and key management should be resolved appropriately by 
following appropriate countermeasures. 
7. ConClusIons
A problem of traffic analysis of image cryptographic 
communications of stream cipher has been attempted using 
multi-entropy measures and fuzzy soft decision approach for 
classifying unknown images as plain image, encrypted image, 
images encrypted with same/equivalent key and images 
encrypted with different keys. The global entropy, sub-block 
entropy and bit-plane entropy of images have been applied 
as features in identification methodology. An asymmetric 
triangular kind of fuzzy membership functions and fuzzy 
similarity based decision criteria have been used to identify 
the class. Experimental results show that one can analyse the 
traffic of image cryptographic communications successfully 
with high precision performance. Some countermeasures have 
also been presented to take care in the design of cipher systems, 
its operations and key management to avoid the repetition of 
keys, the formation of multiple crypts with same encryption 
keys, and hence the safeguarding of image cipher from 
cryptanalytic TMSK attack. The countermeasures suggested 
can be considered in deciding cipher systems suitably for 
secure message communications. Methodology presented 
seems very useful and can be applied to analyse adversary’s 
communications for extracting meaningful information. 
Moreover, it can also be used in image pattern recognition.
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